Political Sociology in David Hume: A Study of the Foundations of Legitimacy and Mechanisms of Social Control
La sociologie politique chez David Hume: une étude des fondements de la légitimité et des mécanismes de contrôle social Dr. Bekaddouri houria*1, Faculty of Social Sciences, Abdelhamid Ibn Badis University, Mostaganem, Algeria Email: houria.bekadouri.etu@univ-mosta.dz Orcid: https://orcid.org/signin Dr. Kerfah Leila2, Email: l.kerfah@univ-bouira.dz , Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, Colonel Akli Mohand Oulhadj University, Bouira, Algeria Received: 05/03/2026 Accepted: 01/07/2026 Published: 10/09/2026 Abstract: Legitimacy and social control in David Hume’s political thought do not originate in transcendental decrees or rationalist covenants, but in the empirical coordination of human belief and habit. This paper investigates how Hume accounts for sovereign authority in the absence of original consent, resolving the paradox of the few commanding the many. Through an analysis of Book III of A Treatise of Human Nature and key political essays, the study deconstructs the tripartite architecture of “opinion”—encompassing perceived utility, historical precedent, and property security—as the sole foundation of governing power. Furthermore, it details the institutional mechanisms of social control, showing how civil magistrates neutralize humanity’s innate cognitive myopia (narrowness of soul) through regularized coercion, custom, and the rule of law. Employing an institutional feedback model and comparative analytical matrices, the research demonstrates that Hume replaces deductive contractarianism with an observational political sociology that explains civic compliance and constitutional stability in modern states. Keywords: David Hume; Political Sociology; Foundations of Legitimacy; Social Control; Artificial Conventions. Résumé: Chez David Hume, la légitimité et le contrôle social ne procèdent ni d’injonctions transcendantes ni de contrats rationalistes, mais de la coordination empirique des croyances et des habitudes humaines. Cet article examine la manière dont Hume justifie l’autorité souveraine en l’absence de tout consentement originel, résolvant ainsi le paradoxe du gouvernement du grand nombre par le petit nombre. À travers l’examen du Livre III du Traité de la nature humaine et de ses principaux essais politiques, l’étude déconstruit l’architecture tripartite de l’« opinion » — englobant l’utilité perçue, le précédent historique et la sécurité de la propriété — en tant que fondement exclusif du pouvoir étatique. De surcroît, elle détaille les mécanismes institutionnels de régulation sociale, montrant comment les magistrats neutralisent la myopie cognitive humaine (narrowness of soul) par la contrainte légale, la coutume et la primauté du droit. À l’appui d’un schéma de rétroaction institutionnelle et de matrices comparatives, cette recherche établit que Hume substitue au contractualisme déductif une sociologie politique observationnelle capable d’éclairer la stabilité constitutionnelle moderne. Mots-clés: David Hume ; sociologie politique ; fondements de la légitimité ; contrôle social ; conventions artificielles. Introduction: In the historical evolution of Western political thought, the problem of political legitimacy—the normative justification of sovereign power and the structural basis of mass obedience—has generated persistent conflict between speculative metaphysics and empirical analysis. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two dominant conceptual paradigms asserted authority over European statecraft: theological absolutism, which anchored political subordination in divine ordination and patriarchal lineage, and voluntaristic contractarianism, which posited that legitimate rule traces exclusively to a primordial covenant executed by autonomous individuals exiting a state of nature. These formulations, articulated across divergent philosophical traditions by Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, and John Locke, approached the state through a deductive framework that assumed sovereign authority requires an initial, conscious surrender of natural rights. The Scottish Enlightenment executed a decisive rupture with this deductive voluntarism. Preeminent within this intellectual reorientation was David Hume (1711–1776), who sought to introduce the experimental method of empirical reasoning into moral, historical, and political inquiries. Rather than relying on speculative contracts or transcendental mandates, Hume approached political authority as an empirical social phenomenon. He posited that governance is neither coeval with human social coexistence nor the result of a deliberate, universal covenant. Instead, political institutions represent artificial conventions that emerged gradually to remedy specific cognitive flaws within the human mind and maintain collective order amidst external material scarcity. Significance of the Study: The significance of this investigation operates across theoretical, methodological, and contemporary institutional levels: Problem Statement: Despite extensive scholarship examining Hume’s meta-ethics and epistemology, his political sociology—specifically his integrated theory of how sovereign authority achieves legitimacy without contracts and maintains long-term social control—remains dispersed across his philosophical treatises, political essays, and historical narratives. This fragmentation raises a fundamental research question: How does David Hume dismantle rationalist contractarianism and theological authoritarianism to formulate an empirical political sociology, and through what precise sociopsychological mechanisms does his framework explain the reproduction of legitimate authority and social control? Subordinate research questions emerge: Hypotheses: Research Objectives: Methodological Framework: This research utilizes a three-dimensional qualitative methodology: Literature Review and Critical Assessment: Contemporary academic literature addressing Hume’s political thought is generally divided into three major interpretive traditions: The present study bridges these perspectives by providing an integrated socio-political framework that connects Hume’s cognitive anthropology directly to the administrative and customary instruments of social control. Structural Division of the Study: To address the research questions systematically, the study is structured into three numbered analytical sections: 1. The Anthropological Genesis of Political Order: From Passion to Convention Prior to the establishment of coercive state apparatuses, political institutions develop out of humanity’s effort to manage destabilizing psychological drives and resource constraints through artificial conventions of justice. 1.1. Cognitive Bias, the “Narrowness of Soul,” and the Need for Justice In Book III, Part II of A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues that human survival depends on social association, which multiplies labor capacity, enables specialization, and provides mutual defense.[7]However, human psychology exhibits an intrinsic cognitive vulnerability: an inclination to prioritize immediate, contiguous goods over distant, systemic benefits. Hume defines this cognitive bias as the “narrowness of soul”: Temporal Bias (Immediate Passion)⟶Erosion of Mutual Trust⟶Social Destabilization⟶Institutional Intervention Hume demonstrates that when external possessions are unstable, easily transferred, and scarce, natural passions lead individuals to pursue immediate self-interest, dissolving cooperative community bonds: “This natural infirmity I may frame into a general proposition, that men are always, in great measure, directed by their imagination, and but little by their reason; and that they prefer whatever is present to whatever is distant and remote… You may satisfy yourself of the truth of this proposition by the most […]